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ΤωΝ ΛΟΓωΝ Ο ΠΡωΤΟΣ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΣΜΙΚΡΟΤΑΤΟΣ, J/7A262C6-71
THE FIRST AND LITTLEST OF SENTENCES
J.J. Mulhern, University of Pennsylvania
Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at the Annual Meeting
o f the American Philological Association, Montreal, January 2006
How are we to interpret these words of the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophistes, in which he
ostensibly attempts to prescribe a rule for logical syntax? And especially, what have they to do, if
anything, with the Theory of Ideas or with Aristotle’s logical syntax? In his Formal Logic (1955), A.N.
Prior pointed out that the Stranger’s prescription, that the first and littlest of sentences must contain a
noun and a verb (Prior gives the example “Theaetetus is sitting down”), is easy to represent in a way that
corresponds to orthodox logical syntax for monadic atomic sentences as they appear in the modem theory
of quantification— φχ. The present essay begins with Prior and goes on to show that, while the
Stranger’s prescription for syntax as described in Prior’s account has by modem standards a conveniently
orthodox flavor, this syntax is violated again and again in the dialogues—a point which Prior did not
address. While one example of irregular syntax, the self-predication, fascinated many mid-twentiethcentury scholars, self-predication turns out to be but a special case of irregular syntax in the dialogues. It
is important, perhaps, but certainly not more important than other examples of irregular syntax. Within
the limited universe of monadic atomic sentence syntax extended with constants for existence and unity,
in fact, all but three of the 14 resulting possible irregular forms are used in one or other of the three
dialogues surveyed here—Euthydemus, Protagoras, and Parmenides.
The interlocutors break the Stranger’s rule, for example, when they uses sentences of the forms
‘Holiness exists’ and ‘Holiness is just’. In fact, the Theory of Ideas, as it has been known from antiquity
to the present, incorporates many sentences like these and thus requires that the Stranger’s rule for syntax
be broken. And so the dialogues contain a variety of sentences and sentence schemata that we and the
Stranger consider ill formed and that we should expect to produce peculiar results when used in
argument, as the paper shows that they do.
My purpose in this paper is to secure these points of fact rather than to urge a position about
them. Nonetheless, it may not be out of place to suggest several cautions that have occurred to me about
the interpretation of the texts. First, if the Stranger’s prescriptions seem to make sense and to fit with the
subsequent development of logic, there would seem to be no good reason to dismiss them as
unnecessarily restrictive, as some idealists have done. Second, despite the occurrences of sentences of
irregular syntax in the dialogues, it is not necessary to view Plato the author as hopelessly confused; there
are no grounds for attributing syntactical insensitivity to someone who, himself, represents this
insensitivity in an orderly and carefully structured way as characterizing the conversation of some of his
fictionalized interlocutors. Last, one might consider the genre of the dialogues and the constant presence
of eristic elements in them. If the dialogues illustrate the undesirable consequences of using ill formed
sentences, the author may have intended more or less to illustrate these consequences for his readers.
Prior’s Account Reviewed and Modified
Clearly, the expression which heads this paper has to do with syntax. By ‘syntax’ I intend,
following the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, “the arrangement of words (in their appropriate forms)
by which their connexion and relation in a sentence are shown.” The one passage in the Platonic
dialogues which most clearly approximates a discussion of syntax in our sense is Sophistes 261 Dl-
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263D4. Prior treated this section as a discussion of predicates—“operators which form propositions, not
out of propositions, but out of names.” It will prove worthwhile to quote Prior at length:
Ordinary speech is full of these [operators], and we commonly call them ‘verbs’.
Thus we might say that . . is sitting down’ is an operator by which we construct the
proposition ‘Theaetetus is sitting down’ out of the name ‘Theaetetus’. Or we might call
‘Theaetetus’ the ‘subject’ of the proposition and
‘. . . is sitting down’ the ‘predicate’, the subject being defined as ‘what the proposition is
about’, or as the name of that, and the predicate as ‘what is said about it’.
‘Theaetetus sits’ [Θεαίτητος κάθηται] was given by Plato as an example of
the simplest form of proposition, his argument being that a proposition, in the sense of a
form of speech capable of truth and falsity, must be at least complete enough to contain a
noun and a verb. ‘Theaetetus is sitting down’ is true if he is in fact doing so, and false if
he is not, while ‘Theaetetus is not sitting down’ is false if he is, true if he is not.. . .
This analysis of propositions into nouns and verbs, or subjects and predicates, is
of course easy enough to represent symbolically. Given the symbols V , 'y \ V as name
symbols, and
‘y/*, ‘ff, etc. as predicate symbols, and treating predicates as operators
which form propositions out of names, we have ‘(px\ *(py\ ‘ ψ χ\ ‘ ψ γ\ as propositional
formulae . . . . 2
Note that the name symbols that Prior gives are individual variables—variables that take names,
demonstratives, or definite descriptions as their values; the predicate symbols are variables that take as
values one-place, first-order predicates, rather than individuals.
Further, sentences are combinations of nouns and verbs that follow a certain pattern or rule of
formation. The Stranger is quite clear that some combinations are appropriate and that some are not. As
he says: “for the expressions show, neither this way [by combining only verbs such as ‘walks’, ‘runs’,
‘sleeps’] nor that way [by combining only nouns such as ‘lion’, ‘stag’, ‘horse’], neither action nor
inaction nor the being of something nor of nothing, until someone mingles the verbs with the nouns”
(262C2-5). As the Stranger says, when you combine a verb with a noun, there is a sentence that is
τω ν λ ό γω ν ό π ρ ώ το ς τε και σμικρότατος. The example is ‘man learns’ or ‘a man learns’, or
άνθρω πος μανθάνει (see below, especially nn. 5 and 7), which is described also as the least and first
sentence (λόγον . . . έλάχιστόν τε κάι π ρ ώ το ν, 262C9-10). We have an example here of the first
and littlest of sentences—one noun, one verb, nothing else, not even an article.3
Prior’s summary of the passage pretty clearly is correct in outline, and I shall follow its outline
even as I expand on it and fill in additional detail. I shall expand on it because the Sophistes directs us in
fact to consider more than just predicates—indeed, more than just subjects and predicates or nouns and
verbs.4 For it tells us that verbs haveto do with actions and
that nouns have to do with those who
perform the actions (262A3-7). And there is more yet, since verbs have to do with more than just
actions; they indicate or do not indicate action or inaction or what something is or is not. And it tells us
that they do so only in sentences. Sentences, that is, give us both actions and states of affairs.
Prior’s outline also needs to be filled in with additional detail. As the careful reader will have
noted, the example of the first
and littlest sentence that the Stranger actually gives
(άνθρω πος μανθάνει) is not the one that Prior reports. We get to Prior’s example only in the next step,
where we are told that the sentence must be about something—τίνος (262E5-6). This something, we
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find out, is a π ρ ά γμ α (262E12), and so the τίνος is actually π ρ ά γ μ α τό ς τίνος. The Stranger sums
up: “I shall speak then to you a sentence by linking thing to action (συνθε'ις π ρ ά γ μ α πράξει) through
name and verb (262E12-13).” Here at last is Prior’s example—Θ εαίτητος κάθηται (263A2).
With this insertion of detail, it becomes clear that the dialogue develops the logic of Θεαίτητος
differently from the logic of άνθρω πος. “Α νθρωπος clearly is not a proper name but a common one,
whether we translate ‘man learns’ with Burnet or ‘a man learns’ with some others.5 The Stranger seems
to be sensitive to the difference of a common name from a proper name. Only after having made his first
point about monadic atomic sentences (atomic because uncompounded, monadic because containing only
one-place predicates) with the example άνθρω πος μανθάνει does he go on to the next little point—
Έ τ ι δη σμικρόν τόδε—about a sentence’s being of something (τινός); τόδε suggests something new
that is coming into view rather than just a continuation. Note that the Stranger speaks in the singular—
σμικρόν τόδε—rather than in the plural. He is pointing to the next single step in the argument and not
beyond it for the moment.
But there is another point as well: the sentence must be of a certain kind or quality
(ποιόν δε γε τινά, 263Al 1). It has seemed clear to many modern writers that the Stranger has truthvalue in mind here, though Burnet thought that it was the having of a tense.6
For present purposes, the important thing is that these are distinct items in sequence. Indeed, the
dialogue is a sequence of questions and answers in which the Stranger leads his interlocutor from the
more easily granted to the less easily granted. Thus it would be difficult to pay too much attention to
sequence. While the sentence with άνθρω πος is not presented as τινός, the sentence with Θεαίτητος
is presented as τινός. As a sentence which is τινός, it can be of a certain kind or quality, whatever we
take that kind or quality to be. In other words, άνθρω πος appears to operate as an expression that can
take names of individual men as values; the sentences that result can be of a certain kind or quality, but
the sentence schema with the variable άνθρω πος cannot be of a certain kind or quality. The difference
is that of some particular man or άνθρω πός τις from άνθρω πος simply; and Theaetetus is άνθρω πός
τις—a particular man.
If there were any doubt about the logical sequence of this argument, it ought to be alleviated
somewhat by referring to Aristotle, who makes a similar stepwise distinction to a similar purpose in
Chapter VII of de Interpretationen where he uses the examples ‘man is white’ or ‘a man is white’ (εστι
λευκός άνθρω πος, 17b9-10) and ‘Socrates is white’ (εστι Σ ω κράτης λευκός, 17b28).7 The use of
the same predicate with άνθρω πος and with a proper name appears to have become a sort of standard
example in Academic discussions of logical syntax, and a Latin version found its way to the mediaeval
scholastics through Boethius’s commentary.8
Why does the Stranger go so carefully through these steps? We can approach an answer to this
question, perhaps, if we pay attention to the obvious point that the Stranger has left out. In Greek, the
simplest sentence, in our sense, is not exemplified by άνθρω πος μανθάνει or Θ εαίτητος κάθηται, as
the Stranger and Prior say it is. Because classical Greek is an inflected language, the simplest sentence
actually consists of the verb alone with its personal endings, and so not two words but one word. Thus
the Stranger clearly is saying something unusual and perhaps counterintuitive and so needs to make good
his ground at every step. Why does he pursue this line? Probably because he is concerned with the
relation of reference to truth. The verb alone with its personal endings does not identify the subject of
the verb; instead, it gives us an embedded name variable. Any of us, for example, can hear someone say
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‘he is white’; but if we don’t know to whom the embedded ‘he’ refers, we cannot determine the truth
value of the sentence, just as we could not with ‘a man is white’.
Even in this modified version of Prior’s account, however, the Stranger’s words contrast starkly
with the actual variety of monadic atomic sentence syntax in the dialogues. While Θ εαίτητος κάθηται
fits the φχ notation, many other monadic atomic sentences in the dialogues do not. The best known
examples, though not the only ones, are the self-predications. These and the other syntactically irregular
sentences can be recognized as such and compared more easily if we employ a clear notation for
expressing them rather than leaving them in a natural language. Adapting and extending Prior’s predicate
calculus notation makes sense even though predicate calculus as a system excludes these irregular
formulae—for example, sentences of the form ',φφ>or ‘ </;<//, to follow Prior again—as not well formed.
Indeed, Prior himself remarks that “to predicate a predicate-of-individuals of predicates is meaningless;”
and, according to him, failure to take account of this fact and to embed it in restrictions on substitution
leads inevitably to the paradox which he states as
ψψ= ~ψψ,
the paradox that non-self-predicability is non-self-predicable if and only if non-self-predicability is not
non-self-predicable.9
But of course *φφ' or a similar expression must be employed if a self-predication or the SelfPredication Schema is to be represented in a notation comparable with the notation that we use for
regular sentences and schemata; and comparability is critical. Granted, the results of extending Prior’s
approach to representing irregular forms in addition to *φφ' are likely to be logically odd. It is, after all,
precisely in their paradox-producing role {pace Meinwald) that self-predications and other irregular
sentences appear in or must be used to reconstruct the arguments of the dialogues.10 For repeatedly in
these dialogues, an expression of a certain syntactical character, although it has an accustomed
syntactical position to which it is well suited, is moved to an unaccustomed position without losing its
original syntactical character and associations. And so my strategy here is to represent the syntax of
these forbidden sentences by arranging in illicit ways, and without regard to the usual substitution rules,
name and predicate symbols that, by themselves, are perfectly legitimate. The resulting formulae which
contain at least one variable are sentence schemata, while those which are composed entirely of constants
are sentences. For convenience, we may speak of all of them as sentences. Of the 18 nonredundant
combinations, 4 are regular or approximately regular and therefore mostly benign. These include φχ, Ox
{Prm. 129B5), xk, and E!x, which represent Prior’s regular sentences and three kinds of sentences about
individuals which should seem relatively harmless to empiricists, whatever their appeal to traditional
Platonists. The remaining 14 exemplify many of the kinds of sentences that would be associated with a
Platonic Theory of Ideas. But they are irregular all the same; and because they are irregular, one has
every right to expect, if the predicate calculus, which presumably reflects some of our intuitions about
the world as we know it, is at all sound, that they will contribute to puzzles if they are used.
I propose, therefore, following Prior’s lead but going somewhat beyond it, to use two subject
variables and two predicate variables to represent some of the simplest sentence forms envisaged in the
Platonic dialogues. Further, I introduce the familiar existence predicate constant E! and the unity
constant O to accommodate especially the language of the Parmenides. The resulting six symbols yield
36 possible sentences or two-place arrays as follows:
MONADIC ATOMIC SENTENCES
IN THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES
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Of course, of these, 18 are redundant, leaving:
NONREDUNDANT MONADIC ATOMIC SENTENCES
IN THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES
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Ε/χ

Examples of most of the irregular sentences can be found in the dialogues. At the end, I shall give a
summary list in which each of the sentences is marked with ‘S’ and a numeral from 1 to 18, with the
numerals based on reading from left to right beginning with the first row.
Irregular Syntax in Three Dialogues
Some of the most instructive examples occur in the Euthydemus and the Protagoras. As each
example of irregular syntax is introduced in the discussion that follows, its number in the summary list at
the end is given in parentheses for ease of forward reference. ‘S6’, for example, which is illustrated in
the text below from the Euthydemus, designates ‘yx’ in the summary list.
Euthd 300E1-301A6:
Káycb εΐπον* Tí yeAçcs, ώ Κλεινία, έπ'ι σ πουδα ίος ο ΰ τω
π páyμ aσ ιυ και καλοϊς;
Συ y à p ήδη τι π ώ π ο τ είδες, ώ Σώ κρατες, καλόν π p ä y μ a ;
εφη ό Διονυσόδωρος.
Έ γ ω γ ε , εφην, κα'ι π ο λλά yε, ώ Διονυσόδωρε.
^Αρα ετερα όντα τοΰ καλού, εφη, ή τα ΰ τά τ ω καλώ;
Kàyco έν παντ'ι έyεvóμηv ύπό άπορίας, κα'ι ήγούμην
δίκαια πεπονθεναι ότι Εφρυξα, όμως δε ετερα εφην αΰτου
yε τοΰ καλού· πάρεστιν μέντοι έκάστω α ύ τώ ν κάλλος τι.
’Εάν ουν, εφη, π α ρ α γ ένη τα ί σοι βοϋς, βοΰς εΤ, και ότι
νυν éycó σοι πάρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος εΤ;
So I remarked: Why are you laughing, Cleinias, at such serious and beautiful things?

SAGP Newsletter, 2005/6.2, p. 53

What, have you, Socrates, ever yet seen a beautiful thing? asked Dionvsodorus.
Yes, I have, I replied, and many of them, Dionvsodorus.
Did you find them different from the beautiful, he said,
or the same as the beautiful?
Here I was desperately perplexed, and felt that I had my deserts for the grunt I had made:
however, I replied that they were different from the beautiful itself, though each of them
had some beauty present with it.
So if an ox is present with you, he said, you are an ox, and since I am now present with
you, you are Dionvsodorus.11
In this passage, Socrates volunteers, as an analysis of why he can say that things are beautiful, that each
of them has something of beauty, or perhaps some particular beauty,12 or this beauty, present with it—
πάρεστιν μέντοι έκάστω α υ τώ ν κάλλος τι. Here κάλλος τι is what the Stranger would identify as
the π ρ ά γμ α identified by a name; compare Theaetetus, who is άνθρω πός τις. The πάρεστιν
sentence is presented by Socrates as an alternative analysis of sentences about a beautiful thing
(καλόν π ρ ά γμ α ) or beautiful things—alternative, that is, to the analysis that things are beautiful
because they are the same as or identical to the beautiful, or τα ύ τά τ φ καλώ , which is the analysis that
Dionysodorus has offered (301A1). Being present to something, Socrates suggests, is not the same as
being identical to it; but being present to it does mark it in a characteristic way.
Dionysodorus puts Socrates’ analysis to the test: if πάρεστιν or π α ρ α γ ενη τα ι (is-present-to)
sentences provide a sound analysis of regular attributive sentences, shouldn’t we be able to say that the
presence of an ox makes something an ox or that the presence of Dionysodorus makes something or
someone Dionysodorus? Here Dionysodorus has spoken not of oxness as present with Socrates but of an
ox so present: he has put individual symbols— ‘ox’ and ‘Dionysodorus’—where, thinking of the
Sophistes, we should have expected predicate symbols.
Mrs. Sprague explains that Dionysodorus “has spoken not of oxness as present with Socrates (as
he ought to do if he is to meet the theory of Forms on its own grounds).”13 And of course she is quite
correct. From a syntactical standpoint, the paradoxical result is made possible by suggesting that
κάλλος τι is present, since κάλλος τι makes τό καλόν into π ρ ά γ μ ά τι. Thus the statement βοΰς εΤ
lias not the form φχ\ nor does it have the form xx, since it is not the ox or Dionysodorus or Socrates who
is present to himself. The whole point of the argument, remember, is that Socrates is offering an
alternative to the identity analysis; presence is not the same as identity. The form of the sentence can
only beyx (S6).
Mrs. Sprague described this passage as a joke, and some readers have relied on her description to
dismiss it as in some way unserious and thus to justify failing to come to grips with it in detail. That was
not her intent, as she has confirmed.14 The passage calls into question the coherence of the notion of
presence because it requires the interlocutors to say what is present, and they say, naturally enough, that
something is present, assuming that that something is some individual thing. And so they are led astray.
It is a joke with serious consequences.
Prt. 330C1-2.
ή δικαιοσύνη π ρ ά γ μ ά τί έστιν ή οϋδέν π ρ ά γμ α : έμο'ι μεν
γ ά ρ δοκεϊ· τί δε σοί;
is justice something, or not a thing at all? I think it is; what do you say?

SAGP Newsletter, 2005/6.2, p. 54

‘Justice is some particular thing’ (ή δικαιοσύνη π ρ α γ μ ά τί έστιν) exemplifies the sentence schema χφ
(S7). The surrounding passage presents an argument whose syntactical irregularity, I think, has not been
appreciated fully.15 The argument runs that if many particular things (actions or persons) can be just
(see 329E5-6, πολλο'ι . . . εισι.ν . . . δίκαιοι), which exemplifies φχ, and if justice is a particular thing,
which exemplifies χφ, then justice can be just (φφ), as we see Socrates leading Protagoras to admit. And
Socrates gets Protagoras to admit also, by way of explanation, that if justice is π ρ α γ μ ά τι, it is then
such, or of a kind, as to be just (τοιοΰτον . . . oTov δίκαιον είναι, 330C7-8) even as, presumably, the
other individual π ρ ά γ μ α τα that are just.
Prt. 331A7-B1.
O úk άρα έστιν όσιότης
οΐον δίκαιον εΤναι π ρ ά γ μ α , ούδέ δικαιοσύνη οΐον όσιον ά λ λ ’
οίον μη όσιον ή δ’ όσιότης οΐον μη δίκαιον, ά λ λ ’ άδικον
άρα, τό δε άνόσιον;
Is not holiness something of such nature as to be just, and justice such as to be holy, or
can it be unholy? Can holiness be not just, and therefore unjust, and justice unholy?
The discussion of justice leads into an ostensibly similar discussion of holiness, which, however, has a
syntactically different result. Socrates secures the admission that holiness also is π ρ α γμ ά τι (330D4)
and, by degrees, leads Protagoras to admit that holiness is of such a kind as to be holy
(τοιοΰτον . . . οΐον όσιον, 330D5-6) and so is (can be?) holy. This admission, of course, exemplifies
the self-predication schema (φφ) (S2). The next step is to get Protagoras to admit, since justice is of a
sort to be holy, and holiness of a sort to be just, that justice is holy and holiness just. From a syntactical
standpoint, ‘justice is holy’ and ‘holiness is just’ in the lines quoted here both exemplify the y/^(Sl)
schema—a sentence which contains two different predicate symbols, both apparently of the same logical
order, and which is not a self-predication.
In short, in the arguments from which these three texts are taken, there are four sentences (or
sentence schemata) all of which depart from the description of τ ώ ν λ ό γω ν ό π ρ ώ το ς
τε και σμικρότατος in the Sophistes, according to which each one should have occurring in it a noun
and a verb, approximately speaking, with, as we should say with reference to Prior’s notation, the noun to
the right and the verb to the left.
Since the Parmenides has been thought to be the work of works on the Self-Predication Schema,
which plays such an important part in the Third Man Argument, it is useful to see what happens with
other irregular sentences and sentence schemata in that dialogue. Two examples are suggested by the
introduction to the dialogue.

Prm. 130B3-5.
καί τί σοι δοκεΐ
είναι αύτή όμοιότης χωρ'ις ής ήμεΐς όμοιότητος έχομεν, και
έν δη και πολλά κα'ι π ά ν τα όσα νυνδή Ζήνωνος ήκουες;
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“And do you think there is such a thing as abstract likeness apart from the likeness which
we possess, and abstract one and many, and the other abstractions of which you heard
Zeno speaking just now?”
Parmenides asks the young Socrates whether there seems to him to be a likeness itself separate from the
likeness we have, also the one and many and all such as he had just heard about from Zeno. These are
interrogative sentences about Ideas; they ask whether certain Ideas exist. Adopting the E! notation, we
can say that these sentences have the form ΕΙφ (SI 5). Whatever one thinks of the practice, existence is
used as a predicate in the Parmenides.'6
Prm. 132A1.
ΟΤμαί σε έκ του τοιουδε εν έκαστον εΤδο$ οΐεσθαι εΤναι*
“I fancy your reason for believing that each idea is one is something like this;”
Next is the sentence ‘each Idea is one’ (132A1). This sentence can be represented as an exemplification
of the schema which has a predicate constant to the left and variable
to the right. In what follows, Ό ’
will be employed as a unity constant in this schema—Ό φ' (SI 1)—and in other schemata and sentences.
These two new kinds of sentence clearly depart from the orthodox regular syntax described in the
Sophistes. In doing so, they set the stage for other instances of irregular syntax which occur in the
Hypotheses. Here are a few:

Prm 137B4.
είτε εν έστιν είτε μή εν
“that the one exists or that it does not exist?”
‘Unity exists’ (εν έστιν) may be the most important and notorious irregular sentence in the Parmenides,
since it is the hypothesis of Parmenides himself as presented in the dialogue and is the lead-off
assumption in the First Hypothesis (137C4). It may be represented by ElO (SI 7). Here, of course, we
see the two predicates that dominated the introduction together in the same sentence; but one of them—
unity—has moved into the place of the individual symbol.
Some scholars may be concerned with the fact that the text goes back and forth between ‘unity’
with the article and without the article—τό εν and εν. The weight of scholarly opinion does not find a
difficulty here, however, since, while abstract substantives such as εν often take the article, the use of the
article is not entirely uniform even in Attic.17 Perhaps it would be more fastidious to follow Jowett and
omit the article in translation when it does not occur in the Greek, whether the choice for a translation is
‘one’ or ‘unity’. But many translators do not follow Jowett. In any case, it does not seem to make much
difference to the way the hypothesis proceeds.
Prm. 137C9-D3 (and 143A6-9).
Ά μφοτέρω ς άν άρα
οπτούς τό εν πολλά εϊη άλλ' οϋχ εν. — ’Αληθή. — Δεΐ δε γε
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μή πολλά ά λ λ ’ ευ α υτό είναι. — Δει. — Ο υ τ’ άρα ολον εσται
ούτε μέρη έξει, εί εν εσται τό έν.
“Then in both cases the one would be many, not one.” “True.” “Yet it must be not many,
but one.” “Yes.” “Then the one, if it is to be one, will not be a whole and will not have
parts.”
‘Unity is one’ is the first item to be proved in the First Hypothesis. Although unity is the subject at the
beginning of the Hypothesis (εί έν έστιν), Parmenides uses a pronoun as subject when he says that it is
necessary for unity to be one (137D1-2). He then goes on to clarify his point, however, by using
έν εσται τό εν (137D3), which more obviously is a sentence of the form OO (SI 3).
While there is much more to be mined from Hypothesis I, the next three examples of irregular
syntax are drawn from the longest of the eight—Hypothesis II.
Prm. 142B7-8.
Ούκούν και ή ουσία του évoç εΐη άν οΰ τα ϋ τό ν
ουσα τ φ ένί·
“Then the being of one will exist, but will not be identical with one;”
As the discussion begins anew, Parmenides moves quickly to another important inference from E!0. It is
that the existence of the One would exist but would not be the same as the One. This is a tricky passage;
but apparently it means that the existence of unity would not be the same as unity. Hence the new form
E!E! (SI8)—the sentence that the existence [of the One] exists.
Prm. 142D1-5 et passim, qsp. 142E6-7.
εί τό έ σ τ ι του evoç όντος
λέγεται και τό έν του όντος ενός, έστι δε où τό αυτό η τε
ουσία κα'ι τό έν, του αυτου δε εκείνου ου ΰπεθέμεθα, του
ενός όντος, άρα ουκ άνάγκη τό μεν ολον έν ον είναι αυτό,
τούτου δε γίγνεσθαι μόρια τό τε έν και τό είναι;
“If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is
one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our
hypothesis, must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?”
τό
τε γ ά ρ έν τό öv άει ϊσχει κα'ι τό ον τό έν·
“for always unity has being and being has unity;”
In a new subargument from Parmenides’ hypothesis, where unity is predicated of existence—
ε ί. . . λ έ γ ε τ α ι.. . τό έν του όντος, which we represent by ‘OEP (S 14), we find something between
the more usual formulae and the metalogical language of Aristotle.18 The assertion that follows in
142E6-7, however, while perhaps metalogical, is not hypothetical.
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fírm. 145B3-5.
Και σχήματος δή τίνος, οος εοικε, τοιούτον
ον μετέχοι αν τό ευ, ήτοι εύθεος ή στρογγυλού ή τίνος
μεικτού έξ άμφοΤν.
“And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will partake of some shape, whether
straight or round or a mixture of the two.”
The sentence that unity is related to an Idea, for example shape, has the form φΟ{S4). In fact, unity,
since it is τοιούτον, will participate in a certain shape—σχήματος δή τίνος; it will be straight or
round, for example. Here several pieces come together. In particular, unity comes to be portrayed
clearly as o f such a sortes to be able to have first-order predicates predicated of it.
These examples show, I think, that irregular syntax in the dialogues is much more extensive than
has been recognized and that it is integral to a range of apparently important arguments, some of which
recur. What is the connection to the Theoiy of Ideas?
IrregularSyntax and the T heoiy o fIdeas
For intuitive purposes, consider the following natural-language examples of the 18 nonredundant
formulae, reading from left to right beginning with the first row and designating them successively ‘S I’,
‘S2’, and so on. The examples are suggested by the Euthydemus, Protagoras, and Parmenides but are
standardized so that ‘holiness’ and ‘holy’ replace ‘φ' in its two positions and ‘justice’ and ‘just’ replace
‘ \}f in the same way. As noted above, four of these are unremarkable; they are not marked in any way.
Of the 14 irregular sentences remaining, those corresponding to the 11 examples given in the passages
preceding are shown in bold face in the following list, and the three remaining possible irregular
sentences are shown in italics:
SUMMARY LIST OF EXAMPLES

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

ψφ Holiness is just.
φφ Holiness is holy.
φχ A particular thing is holy.
φΟ Unity is holy.
φΕ! Existence is holy.
yx A particular thing is
another particular thing.
57. χφ Holiness is a particular thing.
58. XX A particular thing is
a particular thing.
59. xO Unity is a particular thing.

S 10.
SI 1.
512.
513.
514.
515.

xE! Existence is a particular thing.
Οφ Holiness is one.
Ox A particular thing is one.
OO Unity is one.
OEl Existence is one.
Ε!φ Holiness exists.

516. E!x A particular thing exists.
517. ElO Unity exists.
518. ElE! Existence exists.

Many Platonists probably would accept most of these sentences as true, and most uncommitted parties
would recognize all or most of them as endemic to Platonism. The reason is that they reflect clearly the
object-language discussion of Ideas that one actually finds in the dialogues if not the metalinguistic
account of the Theory developed by Wedberg.19 They certainly are enough to suggest a Theory of Ideas.
Objections and Responses
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It may be objected that if this syntactical approach were plausible it would have been suggested
before and that so it must be defective in some way. My response is that there is a good explanation for
its having been overlooked. A clear view of these syntactical issues was very difficult to capture, or to
recapture, in the period between the decline of appreciation for the technical character of the Greek and
the development of skill in using modern notations to elucidate these texts. In Plato studies, the
landmark work arguably is that of Dürr, which appeared only in 1945.20 Although Durr’s work remains
impressive and very instructive, hardly a decade, which is barely a moment in academe, had passed when
scholarly attention became riveted on one irregular form—the self-predication—to the virtual exclusion
of all others; and the appearance of self-predication in the Third Man Argument became a topic of
controversy so intense as to distract many scholars from asking more inclusive questions about syntax in
the dialogues. Platonic scholarship that addresses issues which can be regarded as syntactical at all still
tends to be preoccupied—too narrowly, I suggest—with self-predication in the Third Man Argument.
And so it should not be surprising that broader issues of syntax were overlooked.
A second objection might be that many sentences of these irregular kinds are not asserted to be
true in the dialogues and so need not be taken seriously. Whether they are asserted or only entertained is
indeed an important question. Truth, however, is different from sense, and the question appropriate to the
present account is whether these sentences are regarded by the interlocutors in the dialogues as having
sense. The answer is that at least some interlocutors apparently regard them as syntactically admissible
sentences; their syntax is not attacked explicitly as making them senseless, even though they are used to
produce refutations. They are presupposed implicitly to be well formed.
Thus these objections actually carry little weight, and certainly not enough to obscure the
evidence provided above for examples of syntax which are anomalous by commonly accepted standards.
Summary
In this paper I have shown that the orthodox syntax suggested in Sophistes 262C6-7 and the
surrounding text is not adhered to in the dialogues. Within the limited universe of monadic atomic
sentence syntax extended with constants for existence and unity, in fact, all but three of the 14 possible
irregular forms are used in one or other of the three dialogues instanced here. Self-predication, which, in
the mid-twentieth-century, fascinated so many scholars, turns out to be just one among the many varieties
of irregular syntax in the dialogues.
The nonadherence of other interlocutors to the Eleatic Stranger’s description of monadic atomic
sentences enables these interlocutors to talk about Ideas in the dialogues in familiar ways; unless the
syntactically irregular sentences were used, the interlocutors would not have been able to talk about Ideas
the way they did. The dialogues contain a variety of sentences and sentence schemata that we commonly
consider ill formed and that we should expect to produce peculiar results when used in argument. Of
course, there are no grounds for attributing syntactical insensitivity to Plato the author who, himself,
represents this insensitivity in an orderly and carefully structured way as characterizing the conversation
of some of his fictionalized interlocutors.
The appearance of these irregular sentences in the dialogues apparently engaged Aristotle, who
devoted much attention to what can and what cannot be predicated of what. Thus in Aristotle one finds a
theory of predication which systematically excludes the irregular sentences. The Categoriae addresses
what can and cannot be said of what in the normal course of things, and the Tópica addresses, for
example, unity and existence as predicates. I would suggest in closing that the apparatus I have offered
here provides a largely unexplored way to reconstruct the controversies of the Academy and to track the
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w ay th ey led into th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f w h a t w e h av e b eg u n to u n d e rsta n d as A ris to tle ’s th eo ry o f
p re d ic atio n .

NOTES

'The English translation of the title may be viewed as provisional, since the sense of the Greek original is argued for in the course
of the paper. The text of Plato is that of J. Burnet, Platonis opera (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900-1907). It is a pleasure to
acknowledge useful criticisms of earlier treatments of this material by John Anton, Lynn E. Rose, Gerald A. Press, Joanne
Waugh, and David Wolfsdorf as well as extensive comments on interim versions by Mary Mulhern.
? A.N. Prior, Formal Logic, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 72-73. My references are to this second edition.
In treating this material from the standpoint of syntax rather than semantics or ontology, I am following the traditions of both
grammar and logical analysis. As Goodwin and Gulick say: “A sentence expresses a thought in words. Syntax treats of the
relation of these words to one another.” Cf. William Watson Goodwin and Charles Burton Gulick, Greek Grammar (Boston:
Ginn and Company, 1930), p. 195, §876. And as Carnap says, writing in the 1930s in a vein that was to influence much
subsequent thought on the subject:
the development of logic during the past ten years has shown clearly that it can only be studied with any
degree of accuracy when it is based, not on judgments (thoughts, or the content of thoughts) but rather on
linguistic expressions, of which sentences are the most important, because only for them is it possible to lay
down sharply defined [formation and transformation] rules. And actually, in practice, every logician since
Aristotle, in laying down rules, has dealt mainly with sentences.
Cf. Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax o f Language, translated by Amethe Smeaton (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner &
Co., Ltd., 1937), p. 1.
3ln his otherwise often felicitous translation, White offers a questionable approach to rendering λόγος in these lines. White
writes: “’Speech’ throughout this passage translates the word logos (on which see n. 29, supra). Plato uses the word here so that
a single word by itself does not count as logos. One might wish to translate the word by ‘sentence’ or ‘statement’. That,
however, would be too narrow, because Plato uses logos in a much broader way.” See Nicholas P. White, Plato, "Sophist, "
translated, with introduction and notes (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p.57, n. 74. Of
course, strictly speaking, Plato does not use λόγος in either a broad or a narrow way in the dialogues, whatever his interlocutors
do. Each speaker in each dialogue is different from each other speaker and also from the author; the main speaker in this
dialogue is the Eleatic Stranger, not Plato.

W hite’s tacit move from the observation that an interlocutor says som ething to the assertion that Plato says
it— the Plato Says Fallacy— has an unfortunate effect on his interpretation and translation. Once he commits the
fallacy, the fact that the expression is used elsewhere in the dialogues by other interlocutors in other ways suggests to
him that Plato had a conglom erate understanding o f λ ό γ ο ς and that therefore we should make our translations vague
enough to try to cover all the uses o f λ ό γ ο ς by all the interlocutors who use it anywhere. Quite the contrary; we
should translate so as to be faithful to w hatever the instant interlocutors, be they ever so aberrant, are up to. The
proper form o f the breadth question is: Does the speaker in this dialogue, then, use λ ό γ ο ς in a much broader way?
The answer is No; he uses it in a different way, not a broader one. In som e cases, o f course, ‘speech’ is an
appropriate translation. “Just for exam ple,” W hite writes later in n. 74, “ in 268b Plato speaks o f ‘long logoi' and
‘short logoi' but clearly is not talking about long and short sentences.” But o f course Plato is not talking about long
and short sentences, because Plato is not talking at all. The Stranger is talking; and, ju st as one would expect, the
context shows that the Stranger’s two uses are completely different. In the form er case the Stranger is talking about
sentence syntax; in the latter he is talking about two kinds o f more extended speech— oration and conversation.
Λ ό γ ο ς is an homonym, and perhaps a deceptive one. The two places call for two translations— ‘sentence’ and
‘speech’.
4The issue o f nouns and verbs or subjects and predicates— two distinct ways o f approaching the text— is a bit vexed,
especially with respect to verbs. W hat are to count as verbs in the present case? Jason Xenakis took the somewhat
broadening view that “rhema som etim es means predicate.” See “ Plato on Statem ent and Truth V alue,” Mind 66

SAGP Newsletter, 2005/6.2, p. 60

(1957), p. 168. W illiam Bondeson observed that "μη μ ε γ α (257B 7) [not big] and τ'ι (237D 2) [the indefinite
pronoun ‘a particular thing’, actually at D l; see also n. 14 below] are stated to be 'ρ ή μ α τ α as well as what would
ordinarily be called verbs such as ‘w alks’, ‘runs’, etc.” See “Plato’s Sophist and the Significance and Truth-V alue o f
Statem ents,” Apeiron viii, 2 (1974), p. 43. And elsewhere, Bondeson suggested more directly that ‘predicates’
would be a better translation than ‘verbs.’ See ‘Plato and the Foundations o f Logic and Language,” Southwestern
Journal o f Philosophy 6 (1975), p. 37. Then as now, while we speak o f writing with nouns and verbs when we are
talking about style, in place o f ‘v erb’ we often use ‘predicate’ or an equivalent when we are talking about the same
basic sentences, and we want predicates to include different parts o f speech.
5 John Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato (London: M acmillan and Co., Lim ited, 1914; reprint 1950), p.
287. W hite honors both sides by giving “(A) man learns” in his introduction and “man learns” in his translation, but
he does not address the logical difference o f one from the other. See Plato, "Sophist," p. xxii.
6 Burnet, p. 287, n. 1. Burnet was not unaware o f the alternative. As he added on p. 289, n. 1, “ M ost comm entators
understand by ‘quality’ the truth or falsehood o f the statem ent, but that would m ake the argum ent puerile.” Among
recent writers, A ntonia Soûlez (La grammaire philosophique chez Platon (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1991) exem plifies the view that the quality m ust be the having o f a truth value, apparently because she regards this
section as the sem antic part o f the Sophistes (“la partie sém antique du Sophiste,” p. 285; “détour sém antique,” p.
165).
7It was presum ably because Aristotle saw the expression ά ν θ ρ ω π ο ς as a kind o f variable that he used quantifiers to
bind it. Ackrill laments: “ It is a pity that A ristotle introduces indefinite statem ents at all. The peculiarity o f the
indefinite statem ent is that it lacks an explicit q u an tifier. . . . ” Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione,
translated with notes by J.L. Ackrill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 129. But o f course it’s not
surprising that A ristotle should have proceeded as he did if indefinite expressions had been an issue in the Academy.
Dürr, in a wartim e paper that Prior m ay not have seen, took a different but interesting view o f this passage which
shows clearly the influence o f Lord Russell. Dürr noted that ά ν θ ρ ω π ο ς μ α ν θ ά ν ει differed logically from
Θ ε α ίτ η τ ο ς κ ά θ η τ α ι since, on his view, the shortest sentence or kürzester Satz needed a proper name or Eigenname
to fit into the schem e o f R ussell’s atom ic sentences. “Ά ν θ ρ ω π ο ς μ α ν θ ά ν ει did not count as a kürzester Satz
because it had only a universal concept or allgemeine Begriff and so belonged in R ussell’s treatm ent o f general
propositions. In its focus on form ulae which appeared to be well form ed from the standpoint o f m odem logical
syntax in authors such as Russell and W hitehead, D ürr’s treatm ent excluded irregular formulae. See K. Dürr,
“M oderne D arstellung der platonischen Logik: Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des D ialoges Sophistes,” Museum
Helveticum 2 (1 9 4 5 ), pp. 166-194, especially p. 192.
8 See, for exam ple, Anicii M anlii Severini Boethii Commentarii in librum Aristotelis ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ, C.
Meiser, ed„ second edition (Leipzig: Teubner, 1880), chapter 7 (pp. 135-178), where we see ho/nomù a range of
proper names. William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development o f/¿ ^ ( O x f o r d : Oxford University Press, 1962),
p. 197, fill in some of the background.
9 Prior, pp. 290-291.
10 See comments on Constance M einwald’s approach in J. J. Mulhern, "Interpreting the Platonic Dialogues: What Can
One Say?” especially section iv, “Interpretative Assumptions: Meinwald's Rule on the Statement of Arguments," in
Gerald A. Press, ed.. Who Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic ,4nony/n/ty(Lanhâm, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp. 228-230.
“ This and other extended translations are from the versions in the Loeb Classical Library.
12 Following James Riddell, A Digest o f Platonic Idioms(OvAw&, 1867; reprinted Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert,
Publisher, 1967), § 50. Many English scholars seem to agree with Riddell, whose Dtgel was an appendix to his
commentary on the Apology, in their translations of Plato. Beyond the issue of the indefinite, there remains the little
noticed fact that both Dionysodorus and Socrates appear to offer dyadic relational analyses of the monadic analysandum—
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that is, that both y is identical to x and y is present to x are relational. The interaction of monadic sentences with other
kinds of sentences in the dialogues is the topic for another study.
13 Rosamond K. Sprague, Plato ’s Use o f Fallacy: A Study o f the Euthydemus and Some Other Dialogues^ e w York:
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1962), p. 26.
14 See "The ‘Euthydemus’ Revisited,” presented to the International Plato Society, Trinity College, Toronto, August 19,
1998, p. 27, where Mrs. Sprague writes: “I feel privileged to join with a group of younger scholars who not only take the
dialogue seriously, but also, in a hierarchical manner, take its seriousness seriously.”
15Although, again, Mrs. Sprague’s observation was right on the point: "I feel m yself that Socrates, when he asks
Protagoras at 330C, ‘Is justice a thing or not', is deliberately misleading the sophist, and that he asks the question in order
to persuade Protagoras toplacejustice in die same class asparticularjust ¿¿-//[italics mine]. W hen Protagoras does this, it
then appears reasonable, as it perhaps would not otherwise have done, to inquire w hether this thing, justice, is itself just or
unjust." See Plato’s Use o f Fallacy p. 28, n. 15.
Of course there have been other attempts to tease out the argument out; but many of them focus on ontology and
few show an interest in syntax. As Gregory Vlastos noted in his introduction to the Jowett-Ostwald translation: IAll
through the modern literature one will find the assumption that there is a deep ontological import in his talk of justice, etc.,
as a ‘thing’ (pragma 330cd, 349b; chremata 361b) or ‘reality’ ( ousia 349b). But if that is the case, why isn’t the issue
joined at that point?” See Plato, "Protagoras "(Indianapolis and New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), p. liii, n.
10. Indeed, one might ask, why not? My subject here, of course, is not ontology at all but the syntax of sentences that a
person with a certain ontological outlook might use, however unwittingly.
David Gallop, following up on Vlastos in “Justice and Holiness in Protagoras2W-22\,\ Phronesisb (1961),
focused on the relations to one another of otov, τ ο ιο ΰ το ν , and ο μ ο ιο ν. In his view, though, translating these words
posed "a major difficulty in interpreting the whole passage.” (P. 86, n. 3.) Indeed, Gallop translated oTov by “of the
same class" and shortly found that he was involved in discussing the metaphysics of homogeneity, or likeness of class. As
he said in the same place: “In order to preserve their ‘sortal’ connotation [the connotation of these three adjectives], I
have tried, in spite of the awkwardness, to render Socrates' argument in terms of homogeneity rather than similarity." In
fact, though, there is no need to introduce the language of classes at this point. Indeed, there is nothing especially difficult
about τ ο ιο ΰ τ ο ν and oTov ( talisvtA quah% which are just the demonstrative and the relative pronominal adjectives
answering to the interrogative π ο ιο ν ( qualm) and the indefinite enclitic π ο ιό ν , " Ο μ ο ιο ν raises a separate issue, since it
arguably has no more relation to the others than do any other nonpronomial adjectives. Once into this line of reasoning,
however, Gallop argued that “Socrates is less interested at 330C in ‘Justice is just’ than this [reconstructed argument for
the identity of justice and holiness] would suggest. He uses it only as a stepping stone to ‘Justice is of such a class as to be
just’.’’ (P. 88, n. 3.) By this point. Gallop had lost interest in self-predication, considering it linessentiall (p. 91); and he
certainly was not interested in other instances of irregular syntax.
Following Gallop in some particulars, Roslyn Weiss, in "Socrates and Protagoras on Justice and Holiness,"
Phoenix39 (1985), paid little attention to syntax in her reconstruction of the argument, and so she did not recognize that
the use of τ ο ιο ΰ τ ο ν . . . ο ΐο ν is offered as an explanation of why, say, justice can be just and so is not merely another
way of saying that justice is just. In fact, contrary to Gallop, she asserted expressly that “there seem to be two acceptable
ways of saying ‘Justice is just,’ (1) ή δικ α ιο σ ύ νη . . . δίκ α ιό ν έσ τιν (330c4-5), and (2)
εσ τιν .. . τ ο ιο ΰ τ ο ν ή δικ α ιο σ ύνη ο ΐο ν δίκ α ιο ν είναι (330c7-8),l (Ρ. 337, η. 9.) Thus she collapsed into one the two
different steps and their corresponding syntactical forms that, in our separate ways. Gallop and others including myself
recognize as different parts of the argument. She then w ent on to assert that, in these highly technical dialectical
discussions, ο ΐο ν “is used as equivalent to ‘is’” and "means ‘resem bles’.” (Nn. 9 and 10.) Her assertions, however, lack
any visible support. W hat the argument shows is that once justice, say, is identified as π ρ α γ μ ά τι, it can be treated as of
such a kind that things like being just or being holy can be said of it; sentences such as ‘justice is holy' are made to seem
syntactically plausible,
Jerome Wakefield, in “Why Justice and Holiness are Similar: Protagoras330-331,\ Phronesis32, 3 (1987),
provided still another extended account of the argument but, when he came to the self-predications and the ^ s e n te n c e s .
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he noted expressly that they were established "in ways not to be considered here.” (Pp. 273-274.) Thus the syntactical
issues fell through the cracks yet once more. Again, writing in more or less the same tradition as Vlastos, Michael Frede
recognized self-predication in this passage but completely overlooked the other instances of irregular syntax. See his
introduction to Plato, "Protagoras('translated, with notes, by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell (Indianapolis and
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), pp. xxiv-xxv. See also my n. 4 above.
16 This passage occurs in a discussion o f the three great challenges to the Theory o f Ideas: (1) determ ining what
items the Theory covers— the population o f the W orld o f Ideas; (2) m eeting certain paradoxes connected with the
doctrine o f participation (or another suitable relation); and (3) show ing that Ideas, if there were such, would fall
within the purview o f human knowledge. See J.J. M ulhem, “Plato, Parmenides 130D3-4,” Apeiron 5, 1 (1971), pp.
17-22. R.E. Allen has pointed out in connection with existence as a predicate in the Parmenides that “there is a
sense o f existing or reality that applies to individuals; and it is prior to the quantificational sense” in Plato’s
Parmenides: Translation and Analysis (M inneapolis: University o f M innesota Press, 1983), p. 278.
’7 Goodwin and Gulick, p. 206, §942.
18L.A. Kosman noted that “Aristotle’s meta-descriptions of predication usually take the form: predicate in the nominative
followed by ‘λ ε γ ε σ θ α ι’ or ‘κ α τ η γ ο ρ ε ΐσ θ α ι’ followed by ‘κ α τ ά ’ followed by subject in the genitive." See his
“Predicating the Good,” Phronesis*iii (1968), p. 173. From Kosman’s perspective, of course, all that is lacking here is the
κ α τά , More recently, Boger, Mary Mulhem, and Smith have pointed out that Aristotle typically uses ΰ π ά ρ χ ε ιν with
the dative when working in the metalanguage. See George Boger, “Aristotle’s Underlying Logic,” Handbook o f the
History ofLogic ed, Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods (Amsterdam: Elsevier BV, 2004), p. 129; Mary Mulhem,
“Aristotle’s Formal Language,” Society for Ancient G reek Philosophy, American Philological Association, Boston,
January 7, 2005, p. 4, and “Predicaments and Predicables in Aristotle’s M etatheory,” Society for Ancient Greek
Philosophy, New York, October 15, 2005; Robin Smith, Aristotle: PriorAnalytics{\rxA\^[i^o\\<
>\ Hackett Publishing
Company, 1989), p. 107.
,9Anders W edberg, Plato's Philosophy o f'Mathemaü'cs{S\.nz\ùiv\m\ Almqvist & Wiksell, 1955). What We dberg calls
theses of the Theory of Ideas are not object-language sentences that belong to the Theory, although three of the sentences
in our list have clear relations to W edberg’s theses:
S2. φφ Holiness is holy to W edberg’s (6) The Idea of Y-ness is (a) Y (p. 36).
S ll. Οφ Holiness is one to W edberg's (10) Ideas are not compounded of parts (p. 41).
S15. Eij> Holiness exists to W edberg’s (3a) There is exactly one idea such as that it is by
participation therein that a thing is Y (p. 30).
20 K, Dürr, “Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik,” passim I have made these points at greater length in
"Modern Notations and Ancient Logic” in John Corcoran, ed„ Ancient Logic andits Modern lnlerpretations(Ozx&xzá\\.
and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 71-82.

